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WHY MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD NOT
 
RELEGATE PARENTS TO “LEGAL STRANGERS”1: 

A SURVEY OF THE MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS
 
OF THE ICPC
 
MATTHEW E. CHRISTOPH, ESQ.*
ABSTRACT
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) is a
well-intentioned statute that has led to anomalous and irrational results
in courts across the country. The ICPC’s aim is to ensure that foster  
care placements by state agencies of children across state lines
preliminary to adoption or placement in foster care are in the child’s
best interests. However, certain courts have drastically expanded the
ICPC’s reach to cover parental foster care placements.  This Article
discusses the split in case law, the reasons for limiting the ICPC in 
Massachusetts, and options for nervous courts, attorneys, and state  
agencies when sending a child across state lines. Ultimately, this Article
argues that the ICPC is not the mechanism to utilize when placing a 
child with his or her parent across state lines.
INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Juvenile Court appointed you to represent a 
mother living in New Hampshire. The Massachusetts Department of
Children and Families (DCF) removed her child from her custody while
she was in New Hampshire. Over the summer, your client’s three-year-
old daughter was living with her maternal grandmother in 
Massachusetts. Previously unknown to your client, the grandmother has
* The author is an attorney with the Children and Family Law Division of the 
Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS). This Article contains the  
author’s opinions alone and does not represent the policies, standards, or viewpoints of CPCS.
The author wishes to thank Destini Aguero, Esq. and Professor Vivek Sankaran for their help
and support.
1. The titular term “legal stranger” is attributed to Professor Vivek Sankaran.  Vivek S.
Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents Under the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 83 (2006-07)
[hereinafter Out of State and Out of Luck].
77
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78 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
become addicted to Vicodin following her heart surgery last year. She 
overdosed while the child was in her care. Neighbors found the child 
wandering the grandmother’s apartment building. DCF took emergency
custody of your client’s daughter.
At the 72-hour hearing, you requested the child’s immediate return 
to your client’s home in New Hampshire since the unfitness is not based
on your client. The judge stated that she cannot order this, because of 
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (hereinafter  
“ICPC” or the “Compact”). It has now been eight months since your
client, the biological parent, had custody of her daughter. You have 
frustratingly learned that fourteen steps need to be taken before the
Massachusetts court can return your client’s daughter home. Your
client wants to know why this has taken so long and why her daughter is
stuck in a foster home with a family of strangers.
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is a statute  
that has led to anomalous results for natural parents across the country.2 
The ICPC’s aim is to ensure that placements by state agencies of
children across state lines preliminary to adoption, or placement in foster
care, are in the child’s best interests.3  However, a majority of courts  
have expanded the ICPC’s reach to include parental placements,
including the Massachusetts State Court of Appeals.4  Even if a child is
returned to an out-of-state parent, that parent becomes a foster parent to
their own child, funded by the state and constantly monitored by a social 
services agency.5 
At this point, five states and one federal court have held that the  
ICPC does not cover parental placements.6  This Article will survey the
split in courtrooms across the country, the reasons why Massachusetts 
must limit the ICPC, and alternative options for nervous courts,
attorneys, and state agencies when sending a child across state lines.
Ultimately, the ICPC is not the appropriate mechanism to utilize when 
placing a child with her parent across state lines.
I. WHAT IS THE ICPC? A HISTORICAL PRIMER
The ICPC is the regulation barring your client from regaining
custody of her daughter. As her attorney, some history may prove
beneficial at this point.
2. See infra Parts I and II.
3. See infra Parts I and II.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
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792013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
The ICPC establishes uniform legal and administrative procedures
that govern the interstate placement of children in foster care.7  The  
ICPC was drafted in the 1950s to address growing concerns regarding
interstate adoption and foster care placement of children.8  The  
increasing mobility of the American population and a rising divorce rate
created the need for child protective agencies to safely place foster
children in homes across state lines. The ICPC’s purpose is to offer
protection and services to children who are placed across state lines for
foster care or preliminary to adoption.9  Furthermore, the ICPC extends
the jurisdictional reach of a sending state into the borders of another
party state for the purposes of investigating proposed foster care
options.10  At this time, the Compact has been enacted by all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.11 
7. See Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292, 297 (1989) [hereinafter Hartfield]. The
ICPC was drafted to facilitate placements that “safeguard the interests of the child” and allow
states to properly discharge their “legal responsibility . . . to protect the interests of the child.”
Id.
8. See Kimberly M. Butler,  Child Welfare—Outside the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children—Placement of a Child with a Natural Parent, 37 VILL. L. REV. 896,
896 (1992) (citing Hartfield, supra note 7, at 295). Concerns leading to the development of
the Compact were threefold: (1) failure of existing statutes to provide protection to children 
moved interstate; (2) territorial limitations of states’ jurisdiction that left states unable to
ensure that children received proper care and supervision in a receiving state; and (3) lack of a
means by which to compel a receiving state to provide necessary care. Hartfield, supra note
7, at 297.
9. TEXT OF INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (Ass’n of  
Adm’rs of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 1960), available at
http://icpc.aphsa.org/Home/articles.asp [hereinafter TEXT OF ICPC].
10. See Hartfield, supra note 7, at 296.  “The ICPC was intended to facilitate interstate
adoption, thereby increasing the pool of acceptable homes for children in need of placement.
The ICPC should make interstate adoption easier and more certain.” Id. at 293.
11. See Annotation, Construction and Application of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children, 5 A.L.R. 6TH 193, 208 (2005). “Since compacts are a statute in each
of the jurisdictions that are a party to it, the entire body of legal principles applicable to the
interpretation of statutes also applies to the interpretation of compacts.” In re Alexis O., 959
A.2d 176, 180 (N.H. 2008) (quotations omitted). Thus, ICPC interpretation is a matter of
state—not federal—law. McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (1991); In re Alexis O., 
959 A.2d at 180. See generally ALA. CODE §§ 44-2-20 to -26 (LexisNexis 1991); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 47.70.010 to -.080 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-548 to -548.06 (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-29-201 to -208 (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7900-13 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-60-1801 to -1803 (West 2008); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-175 to -182 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 381 (2009); D.C.
CODE  §§ 4-1421 to -1424 (LexisNexis 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.401-.405 (West 
2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.408-.4101 (West Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4-1 to 
10 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 350E-1 to -9 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
16-2101 to -2107 (2009); 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/0.01-15 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-28-4-1 to -8 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.158-.168 (West 2006 & Supp. 
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80 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
Structurally, the ICPC consists of ten articles, identical in all
member states, and defines the types of foster care placements that are 
subject to the Compact.12  For the purpose of your client’s case, the  
Compact’s most controversial term is “placement” within Article II(d)
which is defined as:
[T]he arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding
home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not include 
any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or
epileptic or any institution primarily educational in character, and
any hospital or mental facility.13 
It is important to note that Article VIII(a) exempts from the ICPC 
situations in which the child's “parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult
brother or sister” sends or brings the child into the receiving state “and
leav[es] the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian in the
receiving state.”14  Massachusett’s lower appellate courts have ruled that
the ICPC does include foster placements with out-of-state parents;
however, the Supreme Judicial Court has yet to rule on the Interstate
2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1201 to -1206 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 615.030-
.050, .990 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art.  1608-22 (2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4191-247, 4251-69 (2004 & Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-
601 to -611 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 2-1 to -8 (West 2008);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 3.711-.717 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.851-.91
(West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-18-1 to -17 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.620-.640
(West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-4-101 to -109 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1101 to
-1102 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.320-.350 (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 170-A:1-7 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:23-5 to -17 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32A-11-1 to -8 (West 1989); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374-a (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7B-3800 to -3806 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-13-01 to -08 (2009); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5103.20-.23, 5103.231-.237 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 571-
77 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 417.200-.260 (2009); 62 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761-65 
(West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-15-1 to -10 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-9-2200 to -
2290 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-13-1 to -9 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-4-201 
to -207 (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.101-.107 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
62A-4-301 to -309 (LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5901-27 (2001); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 34, §§ 121-27 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-100, 63.2-1100 to -1105 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.34.010-.080 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2A-1 to -
2 (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.988-.999 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§  
14-5-101 to -108 (2011).
12. See TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9; Hartfield, supra note 7, at 297.
13. TEXT OF ICPC, supra note  9, at art. II(d); See Hartfield,  supra note  7, at 313  
(“Unfortunately, placement is not clearly defined in the ICPC, making it difficult to determine
whether the ICPC applies to a given situation.”). “[S]ome of this uncertainty [of applying the
ICPC] is also the result of ambiguity in the definitional sections of the ICPC.” Id. at 303. See
generally cases cited infra 31-75.
14. TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9, at art. VIII(a) (emphasis added); see In re Alexis O., 
959 A.2d at 181 (highlighting relevant “placement” language within Compact).
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812013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
Compact.15  Federal and state courts are currently split regarding the  
types of placements to which the Compact applies.16  This split is  
discussed more fully in Section III below.
The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (AAICPC) disseminates and promotes the 
provisions of the ICPC.17  The Association of Administrators is  
composed of each state’s individual compact administrators; each is
responsible for coordinating all ICPC activities within his or her state.18 
While certain state courts, including Massachusetts’ lower state courts,
have ruled that the ICPC is indeed applicable to out-of-state foster
placements with noncustodial parents, such a reading of the ICPC
violates a parent’s constitutional rights to family integrity and places a
financial burden on the state that historically belongs with an individual
parent.19 
Specifically, requesting an ICPC placement is procedurally
daunting for attorneys, their clients, and families. The method of
obtaining a timely home study can be a tremendous headache. To 
properly place a foster child out of state, a state agency in the receiving 
state must evaluate the home and render a decision whether the proposed
placement is in the child’s best interests.20  For a sending state court to
place a child across state lines following an approved ICPC placement,
fourteen steps must occur, averaging several months to complete.21 
15. See Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding
the ICPC applicable to parental placements),  review denied, 700 N.E.2d 268 (Mass. 1998);
see also In re Care and Protection of Xantha, 957 N.E.2d 113, 113 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)  
(requiring home study of mother before possible placement of child).
16. See cases cited infra notes 31-75 and accompanying text; see also Hartfield, supra
note 7, at 303 (“Unfortunately, placement is not clearly defined in the ICPC, making it 
difficult to determine whether the ICPC applies to a given situation.”).
17. For more information about the AAICPC and its role in applying the ICPC, see AM.
PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS’N, ADM’RS OF THE ICPC, http://icpc.aphsa.org (last visited May 13,
2013).
18. AM. PUB. WELFARE ASS’N., COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS’ MANUAL FOR THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 2.12 (2003).
19. See cases cited infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text; see also In re Alexis O., 
959 A.2d at 182 (stating that applying the ICPC to parents leads to “anomalous results”). The
court stated that it is the “traditional duty” of parents to support their children, not the state.
Id. (quoting State DYFS v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)).
20. See Vivek Sankaran, Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children: A Critical
Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 435, 445 (2006) [hereinafter Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children].
21. See N. CAL. TRAINING ACAD., INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF 
CHILDREN (ICPC), 4-6 http://academy.extensiondlc.net/file.php/1/resources/RM-ICPC-SW-
Guide.pdf. The steps outlined are as follows:
1. [The s]ending state’s local child welfare agency sends required paperwork . . . to
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82 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
Most troublesome for many parents is the fact that approval or denial
decision for an ICPC placement is ultimately left to the subjective
recommendation of an individual social worker.22 
The placement of a foster child under the ICPC’s provisions is
complicated not only by the multiple steps required, but also the failure 
of quick foster care placements due to overburdened child welfare
agencies in both the sending and receiving states.23  The current version
sending state’s ICPC office . . . includ[ing] the social history of the child and the
case plan. 2. Sending state’s ICPC office sends required paperwork to the receiving
state’s ICPC office. 3. Receiving state’s ICPC office sends required paperwork to
receiving state’s local child welfare agency. 4. Receiving state’s local child welfare
agency [performs home study and] sends [home study] results to receiving state’s 
ICPC office. 5. Receiving state’s ICPC office ensures the placement is safe and
suitable and not contrary to the best interest of the child being placed and checks
whether the placement may be made or shall not be made . . . . 6. Receiving state’s
ICPC office sends determination to sending state’s ICPC office. 7. Sending state’s
ICPC office forwards the results of the local child welfare agency home study in
receiving state to its local agency. 8. Sending state [court] determines whether or
not placement in the receiving state is in the best interest of the child and whether or
not the placement resource will be used . . . . 9. Receiving state’s central ICPC
office sends required paperwork to receiving state’s local child welfare agency. 10.
Receiving state’s local child welfare agency sends results of the home study to 
receiving state’s central ICPC office. 11. Receiving state’s ICPC office makes a
determination regarding whether or not placement is a safe, suitable placement in 
this child’s best interest . . . and forwards [to sending state’s ICPC office]. 12.
Sending county’s ICPC office forwards the results of the local child welfare agency 
home study in receiving state to its local office . . . . 13. Even if the receiving state
says the placement may be made, the local sending agency or the local court can
still decide not to use the placement resource if it feels the placement is not in the 
child’s best interest or another placement is a better fit for the child . . . . 14. Once a
request to place a child is approved by the receiving state, the sending agency and
the receiving parties work together to complete the actual placement . . . .
Id. See also Julius Libow, The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children —A Critical
Analysis, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 19, 23 (1992) (“In California, prior to September 1991, the
average turnaround time for cases originating in Los Angeles was 145 days.”).  Mr. Libow 
suggests that, “[d]ue to a chronic shortage of personnel, each movement of documents can
create a bottleneck ranging from weeks to months.” Id. at 22.
22. See Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children, supra note 20, at 457 (“The
combination of vague, undefined standards with inadequate review procedures perpetuates a 
system in which the exclusive authority to make placement decisions impacting a child’s
future rests in the personal opinions and beliefs of a single caseworker.”). Troublingly, the
caseworker’s evaluation “is the sole determinant of whether a child can be placed” with her
family or will remain in the sending state. Id. at 447.
23. See id. at 445-46 and accompanying text.  Professor Sankaran’s illuminating article
highlights the troubling time issues surrounding placements. Id. See also A.A. v. Cleburne
Cnty. DHR, 912 So.2d 261, 268 n.5 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (stating ICPC home study would
take a minimum of nine months to complete). OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 6
(1999) (reporting that state ICPC administrators report waiting an average of three to four
months for the entire home study to be completed); BRUCE BOYER, REPORT TO THE 
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832013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
of the ICPC does not contain time standards for home studies nor the
placement decision.24  Foster children are the exception, not the norm, if
they are placed out-of-state within six months of an ICPC request.25 
Once the child is placed in foster care in the receiving state, the
sending state retains financial responsibility over the child until the case
ultimately closes.26  The decision to close the case is left to the sending
state’s department of social services.27  The sending state court renders  
the ultimate decision following an ICPC approval by the receiving state
whether to send the child to the placement.28  Additionally, the sending
state may enter into a financial agreement with a public agency, like the
state’s social services agency, or a private agency in the receiving state
to supervise the out-of-state placement.29  Finally, it is the sending  
agency that retains jurisdiction over, and financial responsibility for, the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 7  (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/journal/118.authcheckdam.pdf (noting in a report to the
ABA, “[a]s a result of all of the problems associated with the Compact, what should take days 
or weeks to accomplish often takes months, or, at times, over a year while children wait in
temporary out-of-home placements for adults in charge of their futures to fulfill their
professional obligations”).
24. See Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children, supra note  20, at 445.   
(“The Compact does not contain a timeframe by which a home study and a placement
decision must be completed by the receiving state.”); cf. AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS ASS’N.
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC): SIDE BY SIDE
COMPARISON OF THE NEW AND CURRENT ICPC, http://www.aphsa.org/Policy/ICPC-
REWRITE/NewICPCSidebySide.pdf. Article V of the proposed “New ICPC” requires the
receiving state to complete and comply with self-imposed time frames. Id. at  3-5. The
proposed ICPC suggests a six-week, or thirty business day, period. Id. at 5.  At the time of
this Article, twelve states have enacted the proposed ICPC; adoption of the “New ICPC” by 
35 states will nullify the current incarnation of the ICPC. Spotlight on Interjurisdictional 
Placement: The New Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, 12 Children’s Bureau
Express 6 (July/August 2011), https://cbexpress.acf.hhs.gov/index.cfm?event=website
.viewArticles&issueid=128&articleid=3227.
25. See Libow,  supra note 21, at 22 (noting that ICPC approval frequently takes  
between six months and a year). The ICPC approval process, the author notes, sometimes
exceeds one year. Id.
26. See TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9, at art. V (“The sending agency shall continue to
have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the
placement.”). Cf. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families v. J.W., 2004 Del.
Fam. Ct. LEXIS 143, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2004) (“[A]pplication of the ICPC to placement
created a financial obligation of the sending state which is inconsistent with the parent’s
primary obligation of support.”). The J.W. court illustrated the predicament of state  
responsibility for a natural parent’s financial obligation: “[I]f the Court would apply the ICPC
to placement of a child with natural parents, the sending state assumes financial 
responsibilities for the child that should be the natural parent’s responsibility.” Id. at *9.
27. TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9, at art. V.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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84 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
child until the adoption is finalized under the ICPC.30 
II. REPRESENTATIVE CASE LAW UNDER THE ICPC
A. Liberal Construction: Noncustodial Parents as Placements
Several state courts have held that the ICPC, and the term
“placement” within Article II(d), should be liberally construed to apply
to noncustodial parents.31  Practitioners and scholars argue this broad  
interpretation more accurately serves the best interests of the child.32 
The three leading cases holding this view are Adoption of Warren, 
Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Leonardo, and Department
of Children and Families v. Benway.33 
In Adoption of Warren, the noncustodial father, based in New York, 
submitted his information for foster care placement following the
biological mother’s voluntary termination of her parental rights to the
Department of Social Services (DSS) in Massachusetts.34  After New  
30. See id.; see also Hartfield, supra note 7, at 309 (“[I]t is the sending agency that must 
comply with the requirements of the ICPC or be penalized for an illegal placement. . . .  [I]t is
the sending agency that retains jurisdiction over, and responsibility for, the child until the
adoption is finalized.”) (citations omitted).
31. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding the ICPC applies to out-of-state, noncustodial parents); Green v. Div. of Family
Servs., 864 A.2d 921, 928 (Del. 2004) (holding the ICPC applicable to noncustodial fathers);
H.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 838 So.2d 583, 585-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding ICPC applies to the placement of children with their non-custodial, out-of-state 
mother); Dep’t of Children and Families v. Benway, 745 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding ICPC should be “liberally construed” to include placement with out-of-state 
natural parents); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding the ICPC applies where DCF has temporary custody and noncustodial parent seeks 
custody); Custody of Quincy, 562 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (noting the ICPC
should be observed when a child is placed out-of-state with noncustodial parent); Orsborn v.
Mont. DPHHS, No. DV 04-30, 2004 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3524, at *11 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct. of
Mont., Lincoln Cnty. May 10, 2004) (holding application of the ICPC to proposed placement
of a foster child with noncustodial biological parent); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Clackmas
Cnty. v. Smith, 811 P.2d 145, 147 n.4 (Ore. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the ICPC applies when a 
child is sent by someone other than parent or relative to out-of-state father); see also Dep’t of
Health & Rehab. Serv. v. J.M.L., 455 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting it
would find the ICPC applicable to the out-of-state placement of a child with a natural parent).
32. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text. See generally Butler, supra
note 8, at 909 (arguing applying the ICPC to natural parents “would best ensure that a child is
placed in a suitable environment”).
33. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513; Benway, 745 So.2d 437; Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 
1021.
34. 693 N.E.2d at 1023. The Glens Falls Chronicle provided notice of the care and  
protection proceeding involving the father’s son. Id.  After receiving notice, the father  
contacted DSS to contest the petition and indicated that he would be interested in caring for
his son. Id.
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852013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
York DSS, pursuant to the ICPC, conducted a home study and notified
Massachusetts in writing that the father’s history of substance abuse and 
current crowded home environment were not in the child’s best interests,
New York denied the father’s request.35  The father appealed  
Massachusetts’ insistence on an ICPC home study, but the court held
that the ICPC is applicable to a noncustodial, out-of-state parent.36  The
court reasoned that because the Department of Social Services had
custody of the child, he was not being placed in New York by his parent,
but by a state agency, and thus the ICPC should be employed.37 
Currently, Massachusetts courts are confined by this ruling holding that
the ICPC is applicable to biological parents.
In Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Leonardo, a
noncustodial mother in Texas contested Child Protective Services’
(CPS) request for an ICPC home study.38 Following a care and
protection proceeding involving the biological father, CPS gained
custody of the children.39  The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the  
ICPC is indeed applicable to the out-of-state placement of foster children
with their noncustodial mother.40  The court  liberally construed
“placement,” as defined following the regulation adopted by the
AAICPC in effect after April 30, 2000, to include “the arrangement for
the care of a child in the home of his parent.”41  While the court reasoned
that the ICPC is inapplicable to a placing party with “full legal right” to 
plan for the child, the mother had a diminished role because of CPS’s  
temporary custody order from the court.42  Rather, the ICPC only applies
to parents whose rights have been voluntarily terminated, diminished, or
severed by the court.43 
The Massachusetts Department of Social Services formally changed its name to the
Massachusetts Department of Children and Families in 2008.
35. Id. at 1025 (“[T]he Department of Social Services in New York specifically  
recommended that Warren not be placed with his father.”).
36. Id. at 1024-25.
37. Id. at 1025 (“The placement of Warren with his father in New York by DSS would
constitute a placement under the Interstate Compact, thereby rendering the provisions of the 
Interstate Compact applicable to the present case.”).
38. 22 P.3d at 516.
39. Id. at 515-17.
40. Id. at 516.
41. Id. at 517 (quoting ICPC Reg. 3).
42. Id. at 519 (stating that “[c]onstruing the ICPC liberally” better “effectuate[s] its
policy and purpose”). The court also rejected the mother’s denial of due process argument
because the mother was only “deprived of her children for [a] relatively short period of time.” 
Id. at 523.
43. See id. at 518.
 
Article VIII(a) of this Compact applies only to the sending or bringing of a child
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86 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
Finally, in the Department of Children and Families v. Benway, the
Department of Children and Families (DCF) denied a father’s request to 
place his Florida-based child with the father in Vermont without ICPC 
approval.44  The court cautiously held that the ICPC is applicable to a  
foster care placement with an out-of-state natural parent because “it
would be negligent to relinquish that child to an out-of-state parent
without some indication that the parent is able to care for the child
appropriately.”45  The court reasoned that the ICPC should be liberally  
construed and the court rejected a strict interpretation and application of
the Compact so that DCF may “maintain[] a watchful eye over the
placement.”46  While many state courts have held that the ICPC is indeed
applicable to natural parents, there is a decisional split among various
courts across the country.47 
B. Strict Construction of the ICPC: Noncustodial Parents Not Covered
Five separate state courts and one federal court of appeals have  
notably held that the ICPC, and specifically the term “placement,”
should be carefully limited to apply only to substitute arrangements for
natural parents, including foster care or pre-adoptive homes.48  Courts  
into a receiving state to a parent or other specified individual by a parent or other
specified individual whose full legal right to plan for the child has been established
by law at a time prior to initiation of the placement arrangement, and has not been
voluntarily terminated, or diminished or severed by the action or order of any Court.
Id.
44. 745 So.2d 437, 438-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Although Vermont disapproved 
of the child’s placement in Vermont, the Florida court ordered the child placed with his father
in direct contravention of the order. Id. at 438.  DCF appealed the judge’s order requiring it to
send the dependent child to Vermont. Id.
45. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).  “Additionally,” the court held, “the provisions of the
ICPC ‘shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof,’ . . . which construction
supports the application of the ICPC to the out-of-state placement of a dependent child with 
his or her natural parent.” Id. at 438 (quoting FLA STAT. 409.40, Art. X).
46. Id. at 439.  “[T]he ICPC should be interpreted to include the placement of a child 
with his natural parents to ‘best ensure that a child is placed in a suitable environment, which,
after all, is the main purpose of the Compact.’”  Id. at 439 (quoting Butler,  supra note 8, at  
909).
47. Compare supra Part II.A. with infra Part II.B.
48. See McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 482 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding the ICPC
only applies to substitute arrangements for parental care); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
Huff, 65 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Ark. 2002) (holding ICPC does not apply to out-of-state, natural
parent); In re C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the ICPC
inapplicable to parental placements); In re Kirsten T., No. JV42346, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 8617, at *11 (Cal Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2005) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to
placement with out-of-state, natural parent); In re Colin R., No. JV42346, 2004 Cal. App.  
Unpub. LEXIS 11492, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to
placement with out-of-state, natural parent); In re Markelle T., No. J181602, 2003 Cal. App.
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872013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
hold this interpretation comports with the ICPC’s statutory language, 
prevents blocking a child’s placement with his natural parents, and does
not misplace financial responsibility for a biological child with a state
agency.49  The four leading cases upholding a strict interpretation are 
McComb v. Wambaugh, Arkansas Department of Human Services v.
Huff, In re Alexis O., and, most recently, In re Emoni W.50 
In McComb v. Wambaugh, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held the ICPC and, specifically Article II(d)’s term
“placement,” does not apply where the child is placed with a natural
parent residing in another state.51  The Third Circuit strictly interpreted 
“placement” to apply “only to substitutes for parental care such as foster
care or arrangements preliminary to adoption.”52  Additionally, the court
relied on the ICPC’s detailed draftsmen’s notes, which specifically
exempted “close relatives” from the purview of the ICPC.53  The court  
said that the necessity of ongoing monitoring of a parental foster
placement can be addressed by a request to the receiving state’s court,
Unpub. LEXIS 5676, at *17 (June 11, 2003) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to out-of-state,
non-offending parent); In re Johnny S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)  
(holding the ICPC limited to situations where proposed placement is foster care or preliminary
to possible adoption); In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2012) (holding the ICPC does not
apply to parents); Dep’t of Servs. for Children Youth & Their Families v. J.W., No. 04-01939,
2004 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 143, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2004) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to
natural parents); Fla. Dep’t. of Children & Family Servs. v. L.G., 801 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to biological parent’s relocation with 
child to another state); In re  Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 182 (N.H. 2008) (holding the ICPC
intended only to govern placement of children in substitute arrangements for parental care);
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (holding the ICPC does not apply to relative placements); In re Mary L., 778 P.2d 449,
453 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (holding ICPC does not apply to out-of-state natural parent); In re
Rholetter, 592 S.E.2d 237, 243-44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the ICPC only applies to
placement in foster care or as preliminary to possible adoption, not biological mother).
49. See cases cited supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474; Huff, 65 S.W.3d 880; Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1; In re Alexis
O, 959 A.2d 176.
51. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 482.
52. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).  The Third Circuit stated, “[w]e are persuaded that read
as a whole the Compact was intended only to govern placing children in substitute 
arrangements for parental care.” Id. at 482. This interpretation “avoid[ed] entanglement with
the natural rights of families [and] is consistent with the limited circumstances that justify a 
state’s interference with family life.” Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481.
53. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481 (“The detailed draftsmen’s notes, supplied by the
Council of State Governments, reinforce the notion that the Compact does not apply to
parental placements. The notes state that Article VIII ‘exempts certain close relatives. This
was done in order to protect the social and legal rights of the family . . . .’”) (quoting Roberta
Hunt, Draftsmen’s Notes on the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (reprinted
in OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOPTION 44 (1972)). See generally Butler, supra note 8, at
908.
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88 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
not by the ICPC.54 
In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Huff, an Arkansas
mother lost custody of her children due to homelessness and
subsequently moved to Colorado to gain financial stability.55  She then 
sought a return of custody.56  The Arkansas Chancery Court ordered an
ICPC home study, which Colorado denied; however, the Arkansas judge
disregarded the ICPC result and placed the foster children with their
natural mother.57 The Arkansas Department of Human Services
(ADHS) appealed the decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court.58  The  
state supreme court, relying on Wambaugh, held that the ICPC is
intended only to govern placing foster children in “substitute 
arrangements” for parental care and not to an out-of-state, natural
parent.59  The court further reasoned that, financially speaking, allowing
the ICPC to apply to natural parents would result in the “anomalous
situation of imposing a financial obligation” on the sending state that 
improperly usurps a parent’s duty to support their children.60 
In In re Alexis O., the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled against 
New Hampshire’s Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) 
holding the ICPC is inapplicable where an Arizona-based natural parent
requested to bring her daughter home from New Hampshire.61  The court
54. See Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 482.
55. Huff, 65 S.W.3d at 882. The Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) had 
custody of the children while the mother resided in her mother and aunt’s homes in Colorado.
Id. During their separation, the mother obtained stable income and housing in Colorado while
her children remained in foster care in Arkansas. Id. ADHS requested a study of the mother’s 
Colorado home and officials found the home to be “inappropriate,” ultimately denying
placement under the ICPC. Id. at 883.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 882 (describing procedural posture of the case before Arkansas Supreme
Court).
58. Id. at 883.
59. Id. at 888.  The Arkansas court relied on  McComb v. Wambaugh throughout the  
opinion. Id.  “This court held that subsection (a) of Article III of the [C]ompact ‘makes it 
clear that it is meant to deal with children who are sent from a sending state into a receiving 
state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption.’” Id. at 887  
(quoting Nance v. Ark. Dep’t Human Servs., 870 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Ark. 1994)) (internal
quotations omitted).
60. Huff, 65 S.W.3d at 888 n.2 (quoting McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 480 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).
61. In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 178 (N.H. 2009). Procedurally, the lower “trial court
ruled that because the ICPC applied, it could not allow the mother to [bring] her daughter
[home] to Arizona until [DCYF indicated that the] placement did not appear to be contrary to
the child’s interests.” Id.  The child’s biological father had brought the children to New
Hampshire and DCYF filed a care and protection petition against the father based on neglect.
Id. at 179.  The applicability of the ICPC issue was one of first impression before the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, which compared Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 482, with Ariz. Dep’t of
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892013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
evaluated the ICPC’s legislative history to aid its analysis given the 
ambiguous “placement” terminology.62  The court mentioned Article X’s
“liberal construction” language, however, it cited Article VIII(a)’s
specific exemption of “parent, step-parent, grandparent.”63  The court  
held that the “limited” ICPC cannot apply to parents.64  The court  
reasoned that applying the ICPC to natural parents infringes on the
traditional notion of a parent’s financial duty to support her children, and
disregards the recognized legislative history behind the Compact.65 
Thus, Arizona, like the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, and the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruled that the ICPC is  
inapplicable to natural parents.
Most recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the ICPC
does not apply to parental placements of children in foster care.66  In  
Emoni W., the state removed the children from their mother, and their  
father, who lived in Pennsylvania and shared custody of the children, 
came forward requesting custody.67  The Connecticut trial court refused,
even though there were no allegations against the father, and held the 
ICPC must be followed before the father could obtain custody.68  On  
appeal, Connecticut’s highest court held that the ICPC’s plain language,
Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 
179-80.
62. In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 180 (“We will review legislative history, however, to
aid our analysis where the statutory language is ambiguous or subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation. We [will] construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its
overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result.”) (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 181-82.
64. Id. (citing  Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 482); see also cases cited  supra note 48 and
accompanying text (discussing ICPC as not intended to apply to sending state placement with 
natural parents).
65. In re Alexis O., 179 A.2d at 182-84. The court discusses the constitutionally
protected right to family integrity in its analysis of the drafters’ intent. Id. at 182 (citing Out
of State and Out of Luck supra note 1, at 70-71). “To apply the ICPC to the return of a child
to her natural parent would lead to anomalous results,” the court said. Id. “[F]or instance, the
sending state would continue to have a duty to support the child, notwithstanding the 
‘traditional duty of natural parents to support their children.’” Id. (quoting State DYFS v.
K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002)). The court discusses “[t]he detailed
draftsman’s notes, supplied by the Council of State Governments,” to buttress the opinion 
“that the ICPC does not apply to parental placements.” In re Alexis O., 179 A.2d at 183 
(quoting Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1, 2 (Conn. 2012).
67. Id.  The mother lost custody for various allegations of neglect, including operating a
drug factory out of the family’s home. Id. The father came forward upon hearing of the
removal and offered that “he had been responsible for the children’s care for extended periods
of time during school holidays.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
68. Id. at 3.  Advising that the father may be entitled to placement “on the condition that 
the court order six months of protective supervision.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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90 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
which says it applies only to “placement in foster care or as a
preliminary to possible adoption,” renders the Compact inapplicable to  
natural parents.69  The court further  reasoned that Connecticut’s child
protection agency and the trial court had mechanisms to quickly evaluate
the father’s fitness and to temporarily supervise the children to ensure
their safety with their father.70  Finally, the court held that it was “highly 
unlikely” that the ICPC’s drafters intended state child welfare agencies
to retain financial responsibility of a child when placed with a custodial 
parent.71 
The Compact provides that it only applies to foster children sent by
a state agency across state lines for placement in foster care or prior to a
possible adoption.72  Furthermore, the federal terminology of “foster  
care” does not include placement in the legal custody or guardianship of
a minor with her biological parents.73  When a child is returned to her
biological parent, the child is in the 24-hour care and legal custody of a
parent. There is no need for substitute care in any form since a
biological parent is willing and able to care for the child. As outlined in
McComb v. Wambaugh, the Compact applies only to substitutes for
parental care and applying the Compact to parents is “contrary to the
plain language of the statute.”74 
III. INTENT OF THE DRAFTERS: THE ICPC IS INAPPLICABLE TO 
PARENTAL PLACEMENTS
A careful examination of the legislative history of the Interstate
Compact reveals the drafters’ intent to exclude parental placements.75 
The ICPC spares certain close relatives from its control, reinforcing the
constitutional notion of family integrity illustrated in the landmark cases
69. Id. at 8-9 (“If the drafters had intended §17a-175, article III, to apply to placements
with all ‘persons,’ including parents, they easily could have used that language in that  
article.”) (internal quotation omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 9 (“It seems highly unlikely that the drafters would have intended that  
agencies, like the petitioner in the present case, would ‘continue to have financial
responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of placement’ when
a parent obtains custody of [a] child.”) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-175, article V (a)).
72. TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9.
73. Federal law defines “foster care” as “24-hour substitute care for children placed 
away from their parents or guardians and for whom the State agency has placement and care
responsibility.”  45 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
74. McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1991);  see Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Huff, 65 S.W.3d 880, 888 & n.3 (Ark. 2002).
75. See In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 182 (N.H. 2008); Wambaugh, 832 F.2d at 481.  
“The detailed draftsman’s notes, supplied by the Council of State Governments, reinforce the
notion that the ICPC does not apply to parental placements.” Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
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912013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
of Stanley v. Illinois and Meyer v. Nebraska.76  The relationship between
a parent and a child is a constitutionally protected and significant right.77 
Massachusetts, the state with the oldest functioning constitution in the
United States, is a beacon for national courts and legislatures in
recognizing fundamental constitutional rights.78  The time has arrived for
Massachusetts to join the Third Circuit and states like New Hampshire
and Connecticut in limiting the ICPC. Additionally, the ICPC and its
regulations are necessary “only in the absence of adequate family  
control,” which in the case of natural parents is not at issue.79 
Ultimately, the ICPC should govern substitutes for parental placement. 
To apply the ICPC to fit natural parents violates the legislative intent and
taxes the already thinly-spread child welfare system.
As noted above, state child welfare agencies are nationally
overburdened and this bottleneck results in delayed placements of foster
children under the ICPC.80  Such delays increase the trauma endured by
76. See id.; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1975) (holding unwed father has
liberty interest in companionship, care, custody, and management of children); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (holding the right to conceive and raise one’s
children is “essential”). See also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923) (applying Due Process Clause to familial rights)); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Ninth Amendment); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williams, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Equal Protection Clause).
77. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1977) (“We have recognized on  
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally 
protected.”); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972);
Meyer, 265 U.S. at 399-401. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944).
78. LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS,
AND HISTORY 307 (Transaction Publishers 1995).  The Massachusetts Constitution was the 
model for the federal constitution, which was drafted seven years after Massachusetts’ in
1780. See also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)  
(holding the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the state constitution); 4
ALBERT B. HART, ED., COMMONWEALTH HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 37-38 (1930)
(describing Commonwealth v. Nathaniel Jennison where the Supreme Judicial Court held 
slavery unconstitutional).
79. See In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 788 (citing Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481)
(discussing draftsmen’s notes which exempt close relatives). The court stated the notes 
explain that the ICPC “exempts certain close relatives.  This was done in order to protect the
social and legal rights of the family and because it is recognized that regulation is desirable 
only in the absence of adequate family control or in order to forestall conditions which might
produce an absence of such control.” Wambaugh, 943 F.2d at 481 (quoting DRAFTSMAN’S 
NOTES ON INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, reprinted in R. HUNT,
OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOPTION 44 (1972)).
80. Libow, supra note 21, at 22.  “Due to a chronic shortage of personnel, each  
movement of documents [under the ICPC] can create a bottleneck ranging from weeks to
months.” Id.
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92 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
children who have been removed from their homes.81  State Compact  
administrators report that home studies routinely take between 90 and
120 days to complete, while other administrators report upwards of a
year.82  The system lacks judicial oversight:  there are no repercussions
for agencies that do not conduct timely home studies.83  Rather, the  
entire administration of the ICPC relies on the voluntary participation of
out-of-state agencies and out-of-state social workers.84 
ICPC decisions are not based on set guidelines or regulations, so 
the out-of-state social worker’s decision to approve or deny the
81. See id. and accompanying text.  Children suffer gross detriment while waiting and
as the waiting time increases, the “detriment becomes more aggravated.” Id. at 23; see Out of
State and Out of Luck, supra note 1 (describing the ICPC’s “irreparably damaging” effect on
the “child’s relationship with his parent”). See also Ellen L. Bassuk et al.,  Determinants of
Behavior in Homeless and Low-Income Housed Preschool Children, 100 PEDIATRICS 92, 98
(1997); Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias,
Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 141 n.14 (1995).  “Most  
children thrive in parental care and suffer harm if that care is significantly interrupted.” Id. at
141. Such an experience may cause the child “grief, terror and feelings of abandonment” and 
may also compromise a child’s “capacity to form secure attachments.” Id. More detailed
discussion on the harm caused by separating children from their parents, even for short
periods of time, can be found in JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 32-34 (1973).
82. See Vivek Sankaran,  Judicial Oversight Over the Interstate Placement of Foster
Children: The Missing Element in Current Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, 48 CAP. U. L. REV. 385, 397-98 (Winter 2009); see also BOYER, 
supra note 23 (“As a result of all of the problems associated with the Compact, what should
take days or weeks to accomplish often takes months or, at times, over a year while children
wait in temporary out-of-home placements for the adults in charge of their futures to fulfill
their professional obligations.”); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 6 (1999)
(reporting that state ICPC Compact administrators wait an average of three to four months for
entire home study completion); A.A. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 912 So.2d 261, 
268 n.5 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005) (noting social worker’s belief that ICPC home study would take 
minimum of nine months to complete).
83. See Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at 82-87 (describing the failure of 
judicial review and repercussions for state agencies who perform delayed ICPC home
studies).
84. See In re Markelle T., Nos. A099841, A100016, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS  
5676, at *19 (June 11, 2003) (proposing where ICPC inapplicable states can reach agreement
for voluntary services); In re Colin R., No. F045842, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11492, at
*15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004) (suggesting that where the ICPC is inapplicable, receiving
state agencies voluntarily agree to provide services); In re Johnny S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 101
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an
agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state providing for the
performance of one or more services in respect of such case by the latter as agent for the  
sending agency.”); In re Alicia F., No. E036318, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10587, at
*56 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2005) (calling for voluntary agreements in place of strict 
application of the ICPC).
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932013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
placement is inherently flawed.85 The decision to approve or deny an
ICPC request is based on the subjective decision of a single caseworker;
there is no uniform set of regulations governing the inspection process.86 
Can we honestly guarantee objective decision making if our client says
or does something that rubs the assigned social worker the wrong way?
In other words, because the determination is based on the subjective
decision of a single social worker and there are no set criteria in studying
a home, the study is inherently flawed.
Furthermore, there is no framework for appealing an erroneous
ICPC decision.87  While certain scholars have criticized the  current
version of the ICPC and provided suitable suggestions for reforming the
statute, no national reforms have taken place.88  Thus, the flawed ICPC
arguably still applies to out-of-state foster care placements in
Massachusetts, including placement with biological parents, in direct
violation of the Constitution.89 
Commentators on the broadened application of the ICPC have
expressed constitutional concerns regarding such application,
specifically as a violation of a parent’s procedural due process rights.90 
Such concern has not yet been raised in the appellate case law. The 
argument is that leaving the decision to approve or deny a placement in
the hands of a single caseworker, and the denial of any appellate
opportunity to such aggrieved parents, is constitutionally unsound.91 
This issue is compounded by the delays of the overburdened child 
welfare system.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
fundamental, private interest of a parent to raise his or her child.92 
85. See Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at 69 (“While a state can consider
any of the above [suggested factors], none of these factors must be considered, nor is there 
any uniform, codified set of regulations governing the inspection process.”) (emphasis 
omitted).
86. Id. at 76.  “The caseworker’s assessment, thus, is often the sole determinant of  
whether a child will be placed in his parent’s care. Despite the impediment created for
biological parents, courts have, for the most part, deferred to state agencies and their broad 
interpretations of the Compact.” Id.
87. Id. at 80.
88. See Hartfield, supra note 7, at 309; Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at
76; Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children, supra note 20, at 445.
89. See sources cited supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90. See Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at 80.
91. Id. at 84 (“[T]here is no established administrative process to review an ICPC
denial. The Compact itself contains no description of the process, if any, that a state must
create for a parent to appeal a negative decision.”).
92. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a parent
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the
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94 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
Specifically, where a parent has a recognized bond to his or her child,
the state may not interfere without providing adequate due process.93 
The denial of the ICPC by a single caseworker may effectively terminate
a parent’s rights to the custody of her child, all without the opportunity 
for a fair hearing or an appeal of that caseworker’s decision.94  Such a  
procedure stands on very imbalanced constitutional grounds.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISING THE ICPC: TIME FOR CHANGE
It is clear from the ongoing national debate regarding the ICPC that
change is needed; the current ICPC, and its manifold judicial
interpretations, display the ICPC’s fundamental flaws.95  Some may  
argue that because the ICPC is currently under revision with the drafting
of the “New ICPC,” that concerns will be answered given this legislative
initiative and new draft created in November 2005.96  However, the  
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western 
civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.  
Our cases have consistently followed that course . . . .”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 
255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between [a]
parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534
(1953). See generally Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children, supra note 20, at
455 (noting the constitutional requirement that children be placed with their biological 
parents); Libow, supra note 21, at 22 (“The United States Supreme Court has consistently  
recognized the constitutional right to family integrity and the rights of parents to raise their
children free of state intervention.”).
93. See Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at 82 (“When, however, the parent
has established such a relationship, the Court has prevented states from infringing upon that 
intact parent-child bond without providing adequate process.”).
94. See id. at 84, n.106.  Professor Sankaran notes, “ICPC offices in every state were
surveyed [for his article] concerning the existence and extent of procedures available to
review home inspection denials.” Id. According to the author, “thirty-five states responded
that no process existed to appeal an ICPC denial.” (emphasis added). Id.  Additionally,  
“[t]welve state[s] . . . stated that some such process existed. In three states, workers did not
know the answer to the question.” Id. Results of this survey are on file with Vivek Sankaran.
Id.
95. See Erik Eckholm,  Waits Plague Transfers of Children to Relatives’ Care, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2008, at A11; Megan O’Matz & Sally Kestin, Foster Kids Get Lost in Out-of-
State Paperwork, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 16, 2002, at B5; Megan O’Matz & Sally Kestin, 
Children Lost Despite Pact Among States, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 9, 2002, at 1A; Rita
Price, Couple Fights for Abused Grandson, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 2009, at A1.
96. See SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON, supra note 24; see also  AAIC homepage, supra  
note 17. For more information about efforts of the American Public Human Services 
Association to reform the Compact, see generally  HISTORY OF THE ICPC, 
http://www.aphsa.org/Policy/icpc_rewrite.htm (listed under “Resource Materials”).
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952013] MYRIAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ICPC
“New ICPC” has only been adopted by twelve states.97  ICPC  
“regulations” are merely recommendations issued by the AAICPC, a
group founded more than a decade after the ICPC originated.98 
“Regulation No. 3” of the “New ICPC” states that the ICPC might apply
to parental placements.99  However, Regulation No. 3 has not been
formally proposed by a majority of states. Thus, it has no legal effect.
Sound recommendations from a number of California courts and
Connecticut have involved either monitoring by the sending state agency
or voluntary monitoring agreements by the receiving state agency, thus
filling the void of the ICPC.100  In  In re Johnny S., a California court 
placed children with a Texas-based parent without complying with the
ICPC.101  The court held similarly to the Third Circuit in  McComb v.
Wambaugh and stated that the ICPC is limited to foster care and possible 
adoption, neither of which would involve natural parents.102 
Additionally, the court said that because California Department of
Family and Children Services (DCFS) can monitor the Texas placement
97. See PROPOSED ICPC: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.aphsa.org/
Policy/icpc_rewrite.htm (listed under “Resource Materials”). “Once the 35th state adopts the
‘new’ compact, none of those states will be party to the ‘old’ compact and their contractual 
relationship with other states will be limited to states who have also passed the new compact.”
Id. at 4.
98. See Out of State and Out of Luck, supra note 1, at 71-72 (noting the Association
lacks the authority to issue authoritative regulations).
99. See “Regulation No. 3”  available at http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/  
Portals/0/Children/AdoptionFoster/ICPC%20Regulations.pdf.  It defines “foster care” as:
The term “foster care” as used in Article III of ICPC, except as modified in this
paragraph, means care of a child on a 24-hour a day basis away from the home of
the child’s parent(s). Such care may be by a relative of the child, by a non-related
individual, by a group home, or by a residential facility or any other entity. In
addition, if 24-hour a day care is provided by the child’s parent(s) by reason of a
court-ordered placement (and not by virtue of the parent-child relationship), the care
is foster care.
Id.  As of the date of this writing, only Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have adopted the New
ICPC.
100. See In re Alicia F., No. E036318, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10587, at *55  
(Nov. 18, 2005); In re Colin R., No. F045842, 2004 Cal App. Unpub. LEXIS 11492, at *15
(Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004); In re Markelle T., No. A099841, A100016, 2003 Cal App. Unpub.
LEXIS 5676, at *19 (Ct. App. June 11, 2003); In re Johnny S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 100 (Ct.
App. 1995). Each of the California appellate cases calls for voluntary agreements in place of
strict ICPC adherence.
101. See Johnny S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96. “We hold that compliance with the ICPC
is not mandatory when a California court places a child with a parent residing in another
state.” Id.
102. Id. at 99 (citing Tara S. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993)). The court reasoned that “the ICPC’s overall design [is] to protect children in 
placements that are substitutes for parental care.” Id. at 99-100.
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96 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:77
by electronic mail, facsimile, and telephone, there is no necessity for  
invoking the ICPC.103  Furthermore, if California DCFS decided it 
cannot adequately monitor the out-of-state natural parent, it may choose
to enter into an agreement for such services.104 
Such agreements are specifically outlined in Article V, subdivision
(b) of the ICPC “[w]hen the sending agency is a public agency, it
may enter into an agreement with an authorized public or private
agency in the receiving state providing for the performance of one or
more services in respect of such case by the latter an agent  for the
sending agency.105 
Moving forward, Massachusetts courts should encourage such 
agreements between state agencies in lieu of the ICPC. Broadly
applying the ICPC to all foster care placements, including with natural 
parents, violates parents’ constitutional rights to raise their children and 
spreads thin valuable state agency resources for every contemplated
placement.106 
CONCLUSION
As discussed throughout this Article, the ICPC provides a
constitutional nightmare to state agencies, attorneys, and, most 
important, natural parents seeking their child’s placement in their homes.
One California Court of Appeals stated that, “the resulting lack of
uniformity is dysfunctional, that courts and rule makers have not been 
able to fix it, and hence that it may call for a multistate legislative 
response.”107  Massachusetts cannot wait for a “New ICPC” to be
adopted by twenty more states while children languish in foster care.
The sad state of affairs confronting our introductory hypothetical
caretaker and her drug-addled grandmother confronts thousands of
families each year. The ICPC is ill-equipped to handle the current
dilemma. Massachusetts attorneys dealing with the ICPC should invoke
California’s cases, In re Alexis O., In re Emoni W., and Wambaugh, and
continue to argue for a strict construction of the ICPC.  Additionally,  
raising the previously unmentioned constitutional issues is essential to
103. Id. at 100-01 (describing DCFS’s appellate arguments regarding constant
monitoring).
104. Id. at 101.
105. See TEXT OF ICPC, supra note 9, at art. V(b).
106. See sources cited supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
107. In re C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (describing the lack of 
uniformity in ICPC application). While five states and one federal circuit court have held the
ICPC is inapplicable, seven states have held the ICPC applicable to parents. Id.
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creating further judicial scrutiny of the ICPC. Together, we can limit the 
ICPC and ensure more efficiency in interstate foster care placements.
